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My topic is familiar to all economists and
many noneconomists. We know that successful
market economies depend on stable and predict-
able economic policies. When it comes to mone-
tary policy, the key issue is the responsibility of
the central bank to maintain the public’s confi-
dence in the purchasing power of money.
I’m going to discuss the topic, however, in a
novel way by tying together confidence in the
large with confidence in the small. The large issue
concerns stability of the purchasing power of
money in the long run. The small issue concerns
the ability of the market to predict the central
bank’s policy actions. By “small” I do not mean
“unimportant” but rather small in time. As we’ll
see in a moment, in the United States today the
market is quite adept—amazingly so, I think—
at predicting what the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) is going to do at its policy
meetings. The two topics—the large one and the
small one—are connected. For market participants
to believe that the central bank is committed to
the price stability objective, they must also believe
that the central bank has the knowledge and will
to achieve that objective. The fact that the market
can predict Fed policy actions FOMC meeting by
meeting suggests that market participants under-
stand how the Fed evaluates the complex set of
information upon which policy decisions are
based.1 Market understanding of why the Fed
does what it does is essential to the markets hav-
I
t is an honor for me to return to Brown
University to participate in this celebra-
tion of George Borts and his 50 years as a
professor of economics at Brown. George
has been a wonderful friend to me over the years.
He is a fine economist and one of a handful of
key university leaders on the Brown faculty. He
has shaped Brown and the economics department
in ways visible and not so visible.
We are going to eat, drink, and be merry a little
later, and that is certainly appropriate for this
event. But no celebration of George would be com-
plete without a serious economics discussion.
During my 24 years at Brown, George and I had
numerous conversations about economic issues—
usually policy issues, for those were the ones we
were most involved in with our own work. Many
of these conversations were over lunch at the Ivy
Room or the Faculty Club, most often with col-
leagues from economics and other departments
around the table. So I think it fitting that I discuss a
monetary policy issue that is important not only
to economists but also to every member of our
society.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not nec-
essarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I especially thank my St. Louis
Fed colleague, Bill Gavin, for his extensive assis-
tance in preparing this lecture. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
1 For research underlying this theme in the lecture, see Poole, William and Rasche, Robert H. “Perfecting the Market’s Knowledge of Monetary
Policy.” Journal of Financial Services Research, December 2000, 18(2/3), pp. 255-98.ing confidence that the Fed will be successful in
maintaining price stability.
Before diving into my topic, it is worth empha-
sizing that U.S. prosperity has the characteristics
of a three-legged stool and that all legs are needed
for the stool to stand. One leg is the entrepreneur-
ial drive and inventiveness of the private sector.
The second leg is the stability of government
finances and the regulatory environment. The
third is confidence in the financial environment,
characterized by sustained low and stable infla-
tion. It is this third leg I am discussing tonight,
but everyone should understand that the other
two legs are just as important.
FORECASTING FED POLICY
DECISIONS
Let’s begin by looking at some recent events
in financial markets. I’ll examine these events by
using several figures, which appear at the end of
the text and in a handout everyone should have.
A little background first. The FOMC, the Fed’s
main monetary policy body, implements mone-
tary policy by setting a target level for the federal
funds interest rate. The Fed calls this target the
“intended rate.” Federal funds are simply bank
reserves held on deposit at the Federal Reserve
banks. Commercial banks borrow and lend these
funds to each other on an overnight basis. The
Federal Reserve can control the interest rate in
this market—the federal funds rate—by adding
or draining bank reserves.
Many observers attribute to the Fed the ability
to control all interest rates. In fact, the Fed’s con-
trol over market interest rates other than the fed
funds rate is indirect and operates through market
expectations about policy objectives and future
policy actions. The interest rate on, say, a Treasury
bill with a 1-month maturity is set in a competitive
market with no direct Federal Reserve interven-
tion. The 1-month rate depends importantly on
market expectations about the average fed funds
rate over the next 30 days. A 1-year rate depends
on expectations about the next 12 1-month rates,
and the 30-year Treasury bond rate depends on
expectations about the next 30 1-year rates.
Expectations about all of these future interest
rates depend on expectations about Fed actions
to change, or not to change, the intended rate.
And those expectations in turn depend on expec-
tations about events and new information that
may lead the Fed to alter the intended rate. The
main effect of monetary policy, therefore, operates
through these expectations about future policy
and events that will drive future policy. We know,
for example, that changes in the home mortgage
rate can have large effects on housing sales and
construction. The mortgage rate today is tied
closely to other long-term rates in the capital
markets, and all these rates are tied to expecta-
tions about future Fed policy.
Now look at Figure 1, which reports daily data
from the futures market for federal funds. The
futures interest rate shown here is the market’s
best guess about the average fed funds rate for
June 2000. The figure also shows the level of the
Fed’s target for the federal funds rate. On May 16,
the FOMC raised the intended rate from 6 percent
to 6½ percent. This figure shows the interest rate
from trading in the futures market for the 30 days
before and the 30 days after the meeting.
The interesting thing about this figure is the
accuracy of the market’s forecast despite the fact
that a fed policy action to change the intended
rate by 50 basis points is a rare event. The first
trading day shown on the figure is April 4. On
this day, the intended rate was 6 percent. The
June fed funds futures contract price reflected a
market expectation that the average fed funds
rate in June would be 6¼ percent. When the Fed
changes the intended rate, the change is usually
25 basis points, and that is what the futures market
was expecting. The June futures rate was steady
until the last week of April when it jumped pretty
quickly in a couple days. Then it continued to
rise during the next few weeks, gradually increas-
ing to 6½ percent. On May 16, the FOMC voted
to raise the intended rate to 6½ percent. Since it
is unlikely that the Fed would raise the target
between the FOMC meetings—the next meeting
was held on June 27-28—by May 15 the market
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its meeting the next day.
What do we make of this situation in which
the market correctly forecasts what the Fed is
going to do? Is the Fed just following the market?
Is the Fed leaking to the market what it intends
to do? Is it a good thing that the market can pre-
dict Fed actions? To answer these questions it
helps to consider the relationship between the
futures market and Fed policy actions in more
detail.
FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Figure 1 illustrates the situation in which the
market correctly forecasts a Fed decision to change
the intended rate. In fact, there are four possible
combinations to consider. The Fed might change
the intended rate, or not change it, and in each
case the market might correctly forecast the Fed’s
decision, or not forecast correctly.
Figure 2 contains a matrix of actual examples
for each outcome from the fed funds futures mar-
ket. It is possible that the market anticipates the
policy decision or that it does not. The two figures
on the left side of Figure 2 show examples where
the policy decision was correctly anticipated. The
two on the right show examples where it was not.
Let’s look at these cases a little further.
The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows trad-
ing in the futures contract for September 1990 and
the FOMC meeting held August 16, 1990. In this
case, the futures market expected a relatively large
(50-basis-point) increase in the intended fed funds
rate, and the FOMC raised the rate 50 basis points.
This case is like the one examined in Figure 1.
The upper right panel of Figure 2 shows
trading in the futures contract for January 1991
and the FOMC meeting held December 18, 1990.
Before the meeting, the markets were not antici-
pating that the FOMC would reduce the intended
rate; the rate for the January futures contract did
not fall until after the FOMC acted. In fact, during
the life of this contract, the FOMC reduced the
fed funds target three times and each change
appears to have surprised the market.
The two panels in the bottom half of Figure 2
show examples where the FOMC’s decision was
to leave the intended rate unchanged. The bottom
left panel shows trading in the futures contract
for June 1995 and the FOMC meeting held May
23, 1995. In this case, the markets expected no
Confidence and Central Banking
3
Figure 1
Fed Funds Futures and the Fed’s Interest Rate Targetchange in the fed funds target and the FOMC left
the target unchanged.
Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure 2
shows trading in the fed funds futures contract
for August 1994 and the FOMC meeting held
July 6, 1994. Before the meeting, the markets
were anticipating a large increase in the target
rate, but the Fed did not change the rate at its
July meeting. However, in this case the futures
rate did not change much after the meeting; the
market was still expecting the Fed to act, which
it eventually did at its meeting of August 16, 1994.
Before I get into this subject any further, let
me mention briefly a few general findings from
my research on this subject, conducted jointly
with my colleague Bob Rasche. For those inter-
ested, the working paper in all its mathematical
and statistical glory is available on the St. Louis
Fed’s web site. Two generalizations from this
research: First, the accuracy of market predictions
of Fed policy improved dramatically in 1994.
Second, most of the changes in the fed funds
futures rates are driven by economic news such
as the monthly employment report and the infla-
tion data. A relatively small part of the changes
in the futures rates comes on days Fed officials
give speeches or testimony. Although Rasche
and I did not investigate the issue of leaks in our
research, I am convinced that leaks are extremely
rare. I know of only one example of a leak since I
arrived at the St. Louis Fed—it received attention
in the press in the spring of 1998—and it only
indirectly concerned the probable future setting
of the intended funds rate anyway.
UNDERSTANDING MARKET
SUCCESS IN FORECASTING FED
POLICY ACTIONS
I’m now going to illustrate the key issues
concerning market success, or lack thereof, in
forecasting Fed actions by analyzing more closely
the case discussed in Figure 1. Let’s put aside the
relatively infrequent cases in which speeches or
testimony by Fed officials seem to telegraph Fed
intentions.AndIalsowanttoputasidethehypoth-
esis that the Fed is simply following the market,
MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION
4
Figure 2
Four Possible Scenariosbecause I’m convinced from my own observation
of the process that this hypothesis is not true.
If the market can predict Fed policy actions
quite consistently, then Fed behavior must be
systematic and regular enough that the market
can make accurate predictions. Thus, the ability
of the market to predict Fed policy actions means
that the market understands the Fed’s objectives
and the Fed and the markets are reading the flow
of incoming information the same way. In this
situation, Fed policy adjustments will not take
markets by surprise.
Now look at Figure 3. This figure provides a
more detailed examination of trading in the June
2000 fed funds futures contract from the initial
trade on January 24, 2000, to maturity on June 30,
2000. The figure also includes the history of the
fed funds target, which stood at 5½ percent on
January 24; the FOMC raised the target to 5¾ per-
cent at its first meeting of the year on February 1-2.
The FOMC raised the target again, by another 25
basis points, at its meeting on March 21. As we
already saw in Figure 1, the final, 50-basis-point
increase came on May 16.
TheopeningpriceofthecontractonJanuary24
implied a June fed funds rate of 6.14 percent.
Private forecasters were expecting some slowing
in the economy. For example, the January Blue
Chip consensus forecast was for 3.0 percent real
gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2000:Q1
and 2.9 percent for the year. The upward trend in
inflation that had occurred in 1999 was expected
to continue in 2000. One way to interpret the June
fed funds futures rate of 6.14 percent on January 24
is that slightly more than half the market partici-
pants thought the Fed’s target rate would be 6¼
percent in June while the rest thought it would
remain at 6 percent. Alternatively, market partici-
pants placed a probability a bit above 0.5 that
the Fed would raise the intended rate by 25 basis
points and a probability a bit below 0.5 that the
Fed would leave the intended rate unchanged.
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Figure 3
June Contract for Fed Funds and Economic NewsFigure 3 includes vertical lines on days when
there were relatively large changes in the interest
rate on the June futures contract. The threshold
I’ve used for defining a “relatively large” change
was ±5 basis points. During the life of this con-
tract, there were 8 days on which the absolute
change was 5 basis points or larger. These days
are sorted into four episodes.
The first episode included a Friday and a
Monday, January 28 and 31. On Friday, January
28, the fed funds futures rate rose 9 basis points.
On that day, the 1999 fourth quarter GDP data
were released showing that real GDP had grown
5.8 percent at an annual rate, well above market
expectations. The January Blue Chip consensus,
for example, had been 4.5 percent. Inflation also
came in higher than expected—2.0 versus 1.6
percent at an annual rate. On Monday, the stock
markets rose sharply and the fed funds futures
rate rose another 5 basis points as markets digested
the unexpectedly good news about economic
growth and the effect that it was having on fore-
casts for future interest rates. After receiving this
information, the market expected the fed funds
target rate to average 6.25 percent in June.
The second episode included a rise and then
a decline surrounding Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan’s congressional testimony about mone-
tary policy. The first day of his testimony was on
February 17. That day the fed funds futures rate
for June rose 6 basis points to 6.27 percent. The
next day, the Wall Street Journal reported,
“Greenspan signaled that the Fed will keep boost-
ing rates unless both consumer spending and the
stock market quickly cool down.”
On February 22, the fed funds futures rate
fell 6 basis points. There were no significant eco-
nomic data released, and so we cannot link that
decline to any particular piece of new informa-
tion. On February 24, the fed funds futures rate
fell another 5 basis points after the government
reported that orders for durable goods fell 1.3
percent in January, suggesting that the economy
might be slowing a bit.
The FOMC did raise the fed funds target to 6
percent on March 21; from examining the April
fed funds futures contract, we know that this
increase was well anticipated by the market. As
can be seen in Figure 3, at this point the fed funds
futures rate for June was 6.24 percent, indicating
that the market expected another 25 basis point
increase at the May FOMC meeting.
During the third episode, the fed funds futures
rate fell 10 points on April 4 and then bounced
back up 5 points on April 5. It is not clear what
was the cause of the initial decline. The stock
market had been very volatile on the 4th—the
Dow Jones industrials fell over 500 points early
in the day and then recovered to finish the day
down only 57. On the 5th, the Dow fell another
131 points, but Greenspan gave a speech that left
markets believing the Fed would lift the fed funds
target in May. At the end of this episode, the fed
funds futures rate for June was 6.28.
The final episode occurred on April 27 with
the release of the advance GDP report for the first
quarter. This report showed that real GDP rose at
a 5.4 percent rate in the first quarter, with con-
sumer spending jumping 8.3 percent, which was
the largest quarterly increase in more than 17
years. Labor costs rose 4.3 percent and consumer
prices continued to rise. It is interesting to note
that the news was exceptional in one way: The
marketwassurprisedbybothhigherthanexpected
real growth and higher than expected inflation.
Since 1994, there had been many upside surprises
about real GDP growth, but they had typically
been accompanied by lower than expected infla-
tion. The Wall Street Journal reported that, “The
inflation news boosts the odds that the Fed will
soon raise interest rates by an aggressive half a
percentage point.” The fed funds futures market
seemed to agree as the rate rose by 11 basis points
on that day to close at 6.41. The rate then rose
gradually to 6.49 on the Friday before the May 16
meeting.
I’ve recounted the story of the June 2000 fed
funds futures contract in some detail to illustrate
a general point. How can the market participants
successfully predict what the FOMC will do at
its next meeting? That is, how do they know the
interpretation the FOMC will place on the flow
of incoming information, such as that recounted
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of the answer is that market participants carefully
follow speeches by FOMC members, especially
those by the chairman, Alan Greenspan. The
track record of FOMC actions is also obviously
important. Understanding how the FOMC has
reacted to information in the past aids in predict-
ing how the Committee will respond to similar
information in the future.
Market participants pull together other types
of information as well. They receive the minutes
of the FOMC meetings with a six or seven weeks
delay, a few days after the next scheduled meeting.
These minutes reveal the topics discussed, sum-
marize views about the state of the economy and
describe the reasons for dissenting votes. The
minutes are thorough, which provides an impor-
tant vehicle for keeping the markets and the
public well informed about Fed thinking.
Markets have been able to forecast Fed policy
actions partly because the policy process is becom-
ing more transparent than it was in the past.
Since February 1994, the FOMC has announced
changes in the fed funds target the same day that
the decisions were made. As recently as the late
1980s, the Federal Reserve was still using a com-
plex signaling method of conducting open market
operations (buying and selling securities) to inform
markets about changes in the fed funds rate target.
This complex method sometimes took several
days to transfer information about policy changes.
Occasionally, the signals were crossed and mar-
kets perceived changes when there were none.
Not only was the process inefficient, but also it
tended to favor the bond market dealers who had
a special arrangement to participate in the execu-
tion of open market operations. Announcing target
changes the day they are made makes knowledge
about policy changes immediately known to all.
Another important feature of post-1994 Fed
practice is that almost all policy actions came at
regularly scheduled meetings of the FOMC. Before
1994, the Fed changed the intended rate more
often between regular meetings than at regular
meetings. Clearly, before 1994, the market was
almost always taken by surprise by Fed policy
actions because the timing of the policy decisions
between scheduled FOMC meetings could not
be predicted.
CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL
BANK
A principal responsibility of the monetary
authorities in every country is to maintain the
purchasing power of the country’s currency.
Monetary responsibilities are split between the
finance ministry (or treasury) and the central
bank. The finance ministry manages government
finance, including tax collection, and the central
bank manages the creation of money. In most
countries today, the central bank has a substantial
degree of independence from the government,
and has assigned to it the goal of maintaining the
purchasing power of money. Independence seems
to be the best way to achieve control over money
creation as necessary to assure stability in the
purchasing power of money.
With a fiat money system, the current value
of the dollar depends on current policy and expec-
tations about all future policies. Confidence in
the central bank is a foundation for confidence in
financial markets. Modern economies thrive on
the extension of credit to people who are young
and people who have good ideas. U.S. prosperity
in the 1990s, extending to this day, has been
driven by new high-tech enterprises and the
application of new technology to existing enter-
prises. The new enterprises have been financed
through private venture capital and the public
capital markets. These firms would not have
been able to raise such a large amount of capital
if lenders had feared that their principal would
be confiscated through inflation.
In the United States, and elsewhere, appreci-
ation of the importance of price stability grew
significantly as people saw the real effects of infla-
tionary policies in the 1960s and 1970s. This
change in beliefs simultaneously increased pres-
sure on the Federal Reserve to achieve sustained
low inflation and increased the determination of
policymakers to achieve that goal.
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expected inflation rate according to the Michigan
survey from 1956 to the present. The data are
quarterly, and the inflation rate shown is the per-
centage change in the CPI over the same quarter
the previous year. The expected inflation rate is
the rate respondents said they expected over the
next year.
The actual inflation rate rose almost every
year from 1965 to 1980. In retrospect, trouble was
already brewing in 1964. Although the actual
inflation rate in 1964 over the corresponding
quarter of 1963 was in the 1 to 2 percent range,
survey respondents expected the inflation rate to
rise, as can be seen by the fact that the expected
rate in Figure 4 lies above the actual rate in 1964.
The actual rate did rise after 1964, and from that
point through the early 1980s the actual and
expected rates moved very much together.
Expected inflation led actual inflation down
in 1982, and after 1983 expected inflation was
somewhat more stable than actual inflation. The
market understood that some of the fluctuations
in actual inflation were transitory, and did not
justify changing views on likely future inflation.
The collapse in oil prices in 1986 reduced actual
inflationforatime,buthadlittleeffectonexpected
inflation. Similarly, fluctuations in oil prices in
1998-2000 first brought down and then increased
measured inflation without having much effect
on expected inflation.
One-year ahead inflation expectations are
inadequate to fully explore the issue of market
confidence in monetary policy, but are the only
survey evidence available back to the 1950s. The
Michigan survey started to ask about 5-10 year
inflation expectations in 1979, and those data
are shown in Figure 5. As an aside, judging from
the behavior of long-term interest rates, market
participants initially viewed the inflation of the
late 1960s and early 1970s as temporary, but by
the late 1970s long-term inflation expectations
rose dramatically. Confidence in U.S. price sta-
bility really did erode significantly after 1976.
However, as policy succeeded in lowering and
stabilizing inflation after 1980, long-term inflation
expectations fell and now have reached the lowest
levels observed since the early 1960s.
Low inflation forecasts over long horizons
reflect confidence that the Fed will be successful
in adjusting interest rates in timely fashion as
required to yield low inflation on the average.
With low inflation on average, the federal funds
target will on average remain relatively low
because there will be no inflation premium bid
into interest rates. The Fed can directly control
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Figure 4
CPI Inflation and Short-Term Inflation Expectationsonly the overnight interest rate. Thus, a relatively
low 25-year bond rate reflects confidence that
the Fed will keep inflation under control. That
confidence springs from the market’s understand-
ing of what the Fed will do with the one-day rate,
on average, over the next 25 years. People in
markets understand very well that it may be nec-
essary to raise the fed funds rate aggressively in




As already emphasized, the Federal Reserve
implements policy through open market opera-
tions designed to keep the overnight federal funds
rate close to the target rate set by the FOMC. Even
if the Fed were to implement policy in some other
way, there is nothing to guarantee that future
policy will be consistent with sustained low
inflation. At any given time, success in keeping
inflation low requires market expectations that
inflation will remain low—the market must have
confidence that the central bank will do its job
not just today but in the future as well.
Where does confidence in long-run U.S.
price stability come from? Sustained success in
achieving low and stable inflation is obviously
important. So also is the institutional structure
of the Federal Reserve System, which insulates
it from day-to-day political pressures. Attitudes
within the System, the government, and the
general public are surely important. Clearly, the
subject is a complex one and beyond the scope
of this lecture.
The element of confidence I’ve concentrated
on—one that I believe is insufficiently appreci-
ated—is that the better the market understands
the day-to-day operation of monetary policy, the
more confident the market will be that the Fed is
on the right course for the long run. Since 1994,
the market has quite accurately predicted Fed
policy actions, indicating that the market under-
stands what the Fed is doing. The market and the
Fed study incoming data and, more generally,
information of all sorts and arrive at a similar
assessment of what the information means for
the appropriate setting of monetary policy.
Confidence in any organization is tainted
whenever some part of its activities comes under
question. The fact that Federal Reserve policy
week by week is systematic and predictable
inspires confidence in the larger issue of Fed
policy over the long run. I believe that this deeper
long-run confidence has contributed to the dura-
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Figure 5
CPI Inflation and Long-Term Inflation Expectationsbility of the current economic expansion and the
increase in productivity growth that has generated
such remarkable growth in GDP over the last five
years.
There is a mystery, however. The FOMC does
not follow a well-specified monetary rule that
can be written down as an equation or formula.
How is it that the market and the Fed can so con-
sistently agree on the interpretation of new infor-
mation and its significance for policy actions, or
lack thereof? I don’t know the answer to this
question. Finding the answer may be important
for carrying into the future the market’s current
success in forecasting Fed policy actions. If we
can formalize what the Fed does, it should be
possible to further improve transparency and
accuracy of communication with the market in
the future. As successful as monetary policy has
been in recent years, there is still a major agenda
for the Federal Reserve and for scholars of mone-
tary policy in assuring that the success continues.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
One of my themes tonight has been the accu-
racy with which the market today can forecast
Fed policy actions. How is the market so success-
ful? The market has an excellent understanding
of the process by which the Fed reaches its policy
decisions. That understanding in turn reflects Fed
efforts to be more transparent and more systematic.
For the most part, the Fed and the market read
the flow of new information the same way. As
information arrives, the market changes the proba-
bility it assigns to Fed action at its next policy
meeting. That is the same process I go through
myself, changing my view bit by bit as new infor-
mation arrives. At the time of an FOMC meeting,
I collate all the information, including the expert
Fed staff analysis, and settle on a tentative posi-
tion going into the meeting. That position is sub-
ject to change, depending on the force of the
arguments my colleagues make during the course
of the meeting.
The goal of the policy actions is to achieve
low and stable inflation for the United States
over the long run. The Fed can do little that is
constructive about short-run fluctuations in the
rate of inflation, but is responsible for the long-
run outcome. The market understands the policy
objective and therefore can judge what policy
actions are required to achieve the goal, given
the ever-changing economic environment. In the
research that Rasche and I have conducted, most
large changes in rates in the fed funds futures
market make good sense given the nature of the
new information that apparently drives these
changes.
This convergence of Fed and market opinion
about what needs to be done is a relatively new
development. Although the convergence is still
somewhat incomplete, its importance for a suc-
cessful monetary policy should not be underes-
timated. I myself continue to work to better
understand how the Fed might further improve
its communication with the markets. The task is
not as easy as it might seem, given the complexity
of the economics and the short-run focus of many
market participants and press representatives.
But that is a subject for another day.
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